Debunking the "China Threat" Thesis

Despite the recent warming in Sino-U.S. relations, many critics of President Clintonís policy of "engagement" continue to portray China as a growing threat to the United States and Asia. This claim is both misleading and dangerous. China is neither as powerful nor as threatening as alarmists suggest. The "China threat" thesis is dangerous, nonetheless, because the provocative policies flowing from such perceptions could heighten Chinese insecurity and poison Sino-U.S. relations.

Despite its recent spectacular economic growth, China remains a poor country. Average incomes are less than one tenth of those in the United States. Moreover, Chinaís development faces serious obstacles in the years ahead: a looming banking crisis, food and energy shortages, the turmoil of dismantling a large, inefficient state-owned sector, infrastructure bottlenecks, burgeoning environmental problems, and social strains caused by growing regional inequalities. China will do well to avoid a major economic downturn.

The opening of Chinaís economy has rendered it increasingly dependent upon foreign trade and investment. Far from threatening others, Chinaís growing economic interdependence offers mutual benefits to both the Chinese and their trading partners. Chinaís international economic ties also give Chinese leaders a vested interest in peaceful and cooperative relations with other nations.

Some worry about Chinaís growing military clout. China is a nuclear power with the worldís largest land army and Chinese military spending has risen rapidly during this decade. Yet this recent growth in spending follows a decade of severe neglect toward defense needs during the eighties. Recent funding increases have been directed primarily at rising personnel costs rather than new weapons. The quality of Chinaís military technology is poor. Chinaís huge, labor intensive land army remains ill-trained and poorly-equipped. Naval and air forces, while improving, remain inadequate to project power beyond Chinaís own borders. Moreover, Chinaís rate of growth in defense spending has been matched or exceeded by most of its East Asian neighbors. China remains a long way from possessing the warmaking potential to seriously challenge the regional military dominance of the U.S. and its allies.

If China lacks the strength to seriously threaten U.S. interests, neither does it possess compelling incentives to do so. Although some characterize China as a "revisionist" power, in many ways the evolving status quo is much to Beijingís liking. The Soviet Union, once Chinaís most menacing neighbor, has been replaced by a relatively weak and pliant Russia. Hong Kong, soon to be followed by Macao, has rejoined the mainland. Peaceful commerce with other Asian countries is fueling Chinaís rapid economic growth. Chinese relations with Russia, Japan, India and South Korea have all improved in recent years. To be sure, China has a variety of grievances with the outside world. Yet these pale in comparison with either Chinaís grim and defiant isolation of the past or the potential gains that continue to pull it toward international cooperation.

Admittedly, China makes for a prickly diplomatic partner. Its leaders are inexperienced in dealing with outsiders and sensitive to criticism. They have increasingly turned to nationalism, in place of Marxism, as a tool for maintaining domestic unity and stability. The Chinese have long memories of imperialist exploitation and embrace a tough-minded realpolitik approach to international affairs. When disputes arise, Chinese leaders rarely fail to defend Chinaís interests with a passion.

Nevertheless, Chinaís bark is worse that its bite. Chinese leaders are open to pragmatic bargaining. China has, in recent years, played a constructive role in addressing regional conflicts involving Cambodia and North Korea. It has made a variety of concessions in commercial disputes with the U.S., including intellectual property rights, textiles and prison labor exports. Tariff levels and other barriers to trade are slowly coming down. China has shown a growing willingness to work through multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. The Chinese currently seek entry to the World Trade Organization. China has refrained from using its veto in the United Nations Security Council to squash United Nations operations in places such as the Persian Gulf, Somalia and Bosnia.

In the area of arms control, China supported extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has signed both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty. Chinese arms exports have fallen dramatically since the late eighties and amount to only 4% of U.S. arms sales.

The most sensitive and dangerous issue in Sino-U.S. relations is the political status of Taiwan. From Chinaís perspective, this is a domestic problem left over from its bitter civil war. Outside interference on the Taiwan issue will continue to provoke Beijingís ire. Still, China is most unlikely to use military force against Taiwan unless the latter were to declare formal independence from the mainland. Thus, Taiwanís own behavior regulates the level of risk that it faces. The U.S. can reduce the likelihood of miscalculation on both sides of this dispute by warning Beijing that an unprovoked attack on Taiwan would bring serious repercussions while reminding Taiwanese authorities that the U.S. will not be there to bail them out should their own reckless behavior tempt a harsh mainland response. Unfortunately, the U.S. has sometimes added fuel to this dangerous conflict, as when President Bush approved the sale of 150 advanced military aircraft to Taiwan in 1992 despite contrary U.S. commitments to Beijing.

Ever since the end of the Cold War, pundits have vied with one another to identify Americaís next global rival. In the late eighties, many pointed to Japan. After a decade of Japanese economic stagnation and political turmoil, it seems clear that the "Japan threat" was vastly overrated. The "China threat" thesis is likely to fade in time as well. Whatever differences China and the U.S. have over specific issues, China is not and need not be an antagonist of America. It would hardly suit American interests to transform China into a foe by indulging in self fulfilling prophesies.

David Skidmore is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Drake University. He spent the 1996-97 academic year as an instructor at the Johns Hopkins-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies in Nanjing, China.