On October 30, 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo of
Nigeria spoke to an audience at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University. In a speech entitled "Democracy and Development in Africa,"
President Obasanjo discussed the deleterious effects of European colonialism,
and the ways in which the colonial legacy had prevented the development
of African nations. "It is virtually impossible to estimate the full
social costs of colonialism, from its inception, through its exploitative
existence, to the huge human and material resources that went into dislodging
it from our continent," he commented. Moments later, President Obasanjo
referred to the colonial legacy as "an impediment to Africaís progress
and development."1 President Obasanjo is not the only individual
to have expressed such concerns and criticisms. Indeed, many Africans,
common citizens as well as leaders, and non-Africans, have traced the current
problems of underdevelopment to the colonial legacy that continues to mar
the African landscape.
Regardless of whether one chooses to refer to them as developing nations, less developed countries, countries of the South, or Third World nations, the fact remains that the vast majority of states on the African continent have not succeeded in creating the proper environment in which economic, political, and social progress are able to meet Western standards of development. Nor have many nations succeeded in meeting standards of development that do not have their roots in the Western tradition. In 1998, the National Summit on Africa issued a report entitled Economic Development, Trade and Investment, and Job Creation. The introduction to the report contextualizes the peculiar nature of African underdevelopment.
"Africa is a paradox: Second in size and population among the continents, and arguably the richest of all in terms of natural resources, Africa consists of a disproportionate number of the poorest people in the world. In 1995, U.S. per capita income was $26,980; in the same year, sub-Saharan Africaís per capita national income stood at $490."2
Many analysts, like President Obasanjo, in their examination of the current condition of African development, are likely to point to colonialism in their attempt to explain the factors that have prevented progress in the realms of society, economics, and politics. For the most part, these considerations focus upon the economic ramifications of the colonial legacy. Those sympathetic with the plight of African underdevelopment are likely to suggest that colonizing powers restricted the ability of African nations and leaders to choose the terms of their economic growth, and that this limitation has in turn constrained progress on all fronts.3
Though these economic considerations are surely one component of the development equation, other factors have received considerably less attention from experts in the field. One factor in particular has been overlooked with great frequency, and an in-depth study of its role in stunting regional and continental growth can provide a helpful way for us to examine the dilemma of African development through a new lens. This issue pertains to the matter of tribalism and ethnic conflict. We shall explore the concept in broad terms before turning to case studies of two nations to examine the ways in which such difficulties serve as impediments to progress.
It is essential that we first recognize the ways in which the African continent was divided by the colonizing powers. The Berlin Conference of 1884 provided the forum in which the debate regarding the division of the continent occurred. Richard Kranzdorf explains the situation of Africa prior to the conference as he writes that "Despite the increasing presence of Europeans [in the middle to late nineteenth century], 90 percent of the continent was ruled by Africans until the last two decades of the nineteenth century."4 When the conference had concluded, only isolated pockets of African-controlled territory existed. The rest had been partitioned by the European powers. Though some, including Kranzdorf, have suggested that the partitioning of the continent was performed with complete disregard for "preexisting ethnic, linguistic, and cultural units,"5 a closer examination of the subject may indicate that the decisions made were quite both deliberate and carefully calculated.
Gamal Nkrumah, in an article entitled "Battling Africaís Colonial Legacy," explains that "the laws and institutions inherited from the colonial powers were often designed to exploit ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences within and between African states."6 (emphasis added) Far from ignoring these divisions among the peoples of Africa, it would instead seem that efforts were made to "divide and conquer." In fact, Lana Wylie notes that "European conquest also generated new hostilities among Africans."7 The exploitation of these differences allowed the colonizing powers to wield an upper hand and were most likely intended to render imperial powers virtually immune from an organized and systematic rebellion of the colonized peoples of Africa. So long as drastic cleavages existed to separate distinct tribes and ethnic groups within Africa, it was unlikely that energy would be diverted towards expelling the colonizing powers. In the same article, Nkrumah refers to the terms of the partitioning of the continent as the "European balkanization and colonialism of Africa."8 In most circles, it is understood that balkanization refers to the process of imposing, or allowing the development of, dangerous ethnic and cultural divisions that could threaten to erupt at any moment. In many ways, it was in the best interest of the colonizing powers to allow such ethnic and tribal divisions to be magnified by supposedly arbitrarily imposed political boundaries, lending credence to the supposition that the balkanization that began under colonial rule was planned.
Clearly, sharpened ethnic divisions increase turmoil, both within nations and within less clearly defined regions. In many cases, the escalation of turmoil generates external conflicts and civil wars that can embroil a particular region and threaten pervasive instability. Of course, it goes without saying that populations engaged in military conflict do not represent fertile grounds for political, social, or economic development. Indeed, where a large portion of the population is forced to become actively involved in such conflicts, it is unlikely that the seeds for progressive change can ever be sown. Masloweís hierarchy of needs, with its explicit divisions between the stages of personal human development, provides the key to contextualizing the psychological foundations that can help to explain the lack of development in war-torn regions.
First and foremost among human needs are the physiological needs for shelter, food, and clothing. Without these essentials, human life cannot continue. Even physical safety becomes secondary with respect to these concerns. But note that if an individual is not capable of securing physical security (and most individuals who find themselves as part of violent military conflict are unable to attain that personal protection), then concerns pertaining to society, personal esteem, and self-actualization may not be realized. Therefore, an individual preoccupied with the task of securing personal needs on the lower levels of the pyramid are often incapable of expressing concern for the broader goals that one can realize in concert with other members of a particular society. For our purposes, this indicates merely that individuals who do not have a solid base upon which to build a meaningful life are unlikely to focus upon development goals that may ensure a more equitable distribution of goods or the growth of political and social institutions and structures from which everyone may benefit.
The partitioning of Africa and the subsequent conflicts generated by said partitioning therefore created an environment in which most individuals struggled to attain their basic needs. Without provisioning for these fundamental needs of human existence, little energy was invested in the process of development. Explained in this way, it is easy to understand why the colonial legacy of ethnic divisions and tribalism has prevented many sub-Saharan African nations from attaining the desired levels of development. As we shall see, such conflicts also create large populations of displaced refugees whose presence can also have a deleterious effect on national economies.
At this point, it would be most useful to turn to particular cases to determine specific ways in which such cultural divisions and ethnic conflicts have, in fact, hindered the development process on the African continent. As Kranzdorf notes, "Ongoing struggles in such diverse states as Angola, Burundi, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone may be explained, in part, by deep-seated ethnic divisions."9 Therefore, an examination of any of these struggles and continuing conflicts, or others like them, would illustrate the point equally well. In the analysis that follows, we shall utilize as pared down case studies the nations of Somalia and Rwanda, both because they demonstrate the point well and because they represent highly salient examples.
Somalia
Recent data indicate the frightening degree of underdevelopment in Somalia. In 1998, the nation ranked as one of the five poorest nations in the world. Its annual per capita income in US dollars stood at only $176. Infant mortality rates are among the highest on the African continent (125 deaths per 1,000 live births), and the nation continues to exist as a "stateless" entity virtually devoid of the political leadership necessary to constitute effective governance.10 Without question, the situation in Somalia is such that political, social, and economic decay seems to be the norm. The effects of the tribal divisions perpetuated by the colonial powers have contributed substantially to this unfortunate state of affairs.
Gamal Nkrumah explains the effects of the colonial legacy in Somalia with reference to tribalism when he writes that
"Even where there was a homogenous culture as in Somalia, the colonial authorities conspired to carve up separate colonies to exacerbate tribal divisions. The Somali people who formed one ethnic group, speaking one language, Somali, and sharing one religion, Islam, were divided by colonial boundaries and subjected to five different colonial authorities: French, Britishóin Somaliland and in KenyaóItalian, and Ethiopian."11
The conditions of independence stipulated that British Somaliland be united with Italian Somaliland, and when these conditions had been agreed to, independence was granted on July 1, 1960.12 During its early days, the independent Somali Republic was plagued by "increasing corruption, clanism, and political gridlock," and the system of national politics was defined on the basis of clan/tribal identity. Severe conflict began to tear away at the nation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, warranting an influx of United Nations peacekeepers sent to quell the hostilities and make viable the creation of a peaceful environment. Canada was among the nations that supplied peacekeepers for this particular mission, but before it sent its troops to the region, a Commission of Inquiry was established to determine the nature of the conflict in Somalia. This Commission provided a detailed analysis of the current situation:
"After the country's independence in 1960, economic growth failed to keep pace with the rise in population caused by the influx of refugeesÖ Following the civil war, the towns between Ethiopia and the port of Bossasso in the Mudug region showed some increased economic activity, while the surrounding countryside showed signs of serious economic collapse. In the south, economic collapse followed inter-clan warfare."13 (emphasis in original)
The preceding analysis begins to suggest the ways in which conflict generated by tribalism can tear away at national unity and contribute to an unstable environment in which little time, money, and effort are invested in the processes of development.
Though they may not utilize the same terminology (Masloweís Hierarchy of Needs) to discuss the nature of their problems, Somalians also recognize that their current situation prevents them from realizing the type of development needed to protect and guide the nation. In September 1995, a Somali elder commented:
"Development is about human beings. They need four things. First is water. It is the first thing needed to live. Without it a plant, an animal or a baby dies. Second, is food. Without enough of it, life is miserable and short. Third, once water and food are won, is health - otherwise the human being becomes sick. Fourth is education, once a human being has water, food and health he needs to learn to open new horizons and unlock new possibilities. And there is a fifth - peace and order. Without those none of the four basic needs can be sustained."14
There can be no doubt that without colonial influence, the ethnic divisions that currently exist would not have became such dominant and overriding concerns. And, in the absence of such divisions, it is likely that the nation would have developed at a substantially faster rate, and with fewer barriers to impede its progress.
Rwanda
Rwanda, of course, forms the quintessential example of African tribalism at its worst. Once again, the variety of tribalism present in that nation had its origins in colonial influence as well. Of course, because the particular conditions of the war between the Hutu and Tutsi factions in Rwanda have received such considerable attention, it is not necessary that much time be spent elaborating the particular conditions that led to the systematic genocide that tore the nation apart in the early 1990s. It is, however, worth briefly mentioning the magnitude of the slaughter that occurred. The pace of killing, it has now been confirmed, was so rapid that it by far exceeded that rate at which Jews were exterminated at the peak of the Holocaust. Estimates of the number of those killed range, on the conservative end, from 500,000 to 1 million at the other extreme. Most scholars and international observers seem to have come to some agreement that approximately 800,000 civilians lost their lives during the brief span of three months in 1994 during which the ethnic cleansing campaign was waged in Rwanda. The brunt of this analysis will focus upon the ways in which colonial rule was responsible for exacerbating tribal divisions and creating an environment in which conflict was imminent. Consider the following discussion of colonial-generated tribalism in Rwanda:
"The ordeal of colonialism transformed Rwandan society in a highly detrimental fashion. German, and later Belgian, rulers came to Rwanda and the rest of Africa with firmly held convictions about race and race hierarchy. Whites naturally were thought to be superior, but among Africans certain tribes (or what were thought of as tribes) were deemed to be more worthy than their fellow blacks. The Tutsis impressed Europeans with their grace, nobility, and European-like features. In short, Germans and Belgians considered the Tutsis to be born to rule, and decided to administer the country indirectly using the power structure they had found in place. Thus, it was colonial authorities (especially Belgians) who were largely responsible for creating tribal identities among the Tutsis and Hutus. Europeans first ruled through Tutsis, and then after World War II Belgian radicals (Marxists who thought in terms of class war) encouraged Hutus to intensify their struggle against their Tutsi oppressors."15
These divisions have continued to persist and they were central to the conflict that ultimately erupted in 1994. In the war that ensued between these competing tribal factions, more than 800,000 people lost their lives during the course of 100 days of fighting.16 This substantial decrease in the national population, and the inability of most citizens to contribute to economic, social, or political development while the war was being fought clearly exacerbated to the underdeveloped status of Rwanda.
Of the 174 nations evaluated in the 1999 Human Development Index, Rwanda ranked 164th in terms of overall development. Not surprisingly, the last twenty-four nations on the list are located in sub-Saharan Africa.17 To be sure, the ethnic divisions between the different tribal groups of Rwanda explain many of the reasons for the present state of underdevelopment.
Conclusion
Colonialism has played a crucial role in the underdevelopment and decay of the nations of sub-Saharan Africa. Most analysts agree that the economic ramifications of colonialism were a determining factor in shaping the lesser-developed status of these nations in the present context. Despite the validity of this analysis, however, it is essential that we look also to other factors in our evaluation of the legacy of colonialism. Colonial nations, it has been shown, made an effort to protect their own interests and national security by creating within Africa a patchwork of nation-states that seemed to have been drawn without consideration for existing cultural and linguistic patterns of settlement. Closer examination, however, indicates that these boundaries were, in all likelihood, intended to provoke intra-continental conflict so as to prevent the spread of conflict to include European troops. Colonizing powers understood that there is always the potential for conflict when imperialistic missions are undertaken. But if the powerless and conquered peoples can be made to fight among themselves, they are considerably less likely to turn their collective efforts against their oppressors. Such was the reasoning of colonial powers.
Though it is impossible to predict what may have happened had the colonial powers partitioned the continent in a manner that reflected respect for existing ethnic divisions, we may reasonably speculate that the conflicts that have defined the African continent since de-colonization would not have been as pervasive or devastating under such circumstances. Therefore, it is apparent that European colonialism most certainly contributed to the fact that African nations lag behind most others in terms of development.
Of course, one could cite countless examples of tribal conflict that has been generated by the divisions that continue to be maintained today. These struggles have had as much of an effect on the underdevelopment of African nations as the economic limitations imposed by colonialism. Therefore, any future attempts to encourage development must take into consideration ethnic divisions that have, for too long, been virtually ignored. Foreign affairs columnist Jonathan Powers explains that
"There are really two choices for those parts of Africa besieged by tribal conflict--and that goes for Rwanda, Nigeria, the Sudan or Angola as much as it does for the Congo. To start a civilized divorce, if necessary with help from neutral outsiders. Or to build a federal democratic state, as South Africa has done. The day when the strongman can hold sway from the centreÖis obviously over."18
This process does not promise to be easy, but the difficulty of the task should not prevent us from acknowledging that it must be accomplished. The future threatens to bring more tribal conflicts, more deaths, further decay, and less hope for development. Until these problems are solved, little hope exists.
References
1 The full text of President Obasanjoís speech is available
at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidevents/president_obasanjospeech.htm
His remarks were delivered before an ARCO Forum for Public Affairs.
2 The National Summit on Africa: Economic
Development, Trade and Investment, and Job Creation, http://www.africasummit.org/themes/econ/econdev.htm,
1998
3 This concept is most frequently referred to as
path dependence, a development theory which postulates that colonizing
powers were able to shape the future development of African economies by
making them dependent upon a particular course of economic growth from
which it was difficult, if not impossible, to deviate.
4 Weatherby, Joseph N., et al: The Other
World: Issues and Politics of the Developing World, Addison Wesley
Longman, 2000, p. 178
5 Ibid.
6 Nkrumah, Gamal: "Battling Africaís Colonial
Legacy," Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 381, June 11-17, 1998 http://163.121.16/weekly/1998/381/in1.htm
7 Wiarda, Howard J, et al: Non-Western Theories
of Development: Regional Norms versus Global Trends, Harcourt Bruce
Publishers, 1999, p. 87
8 Ibid.
9 Weatherby, Joseph N., et al: The Other
World: Issues and Politics of the Developing World, Addison Wesley
Longman, 2000, p. 175
10 UN Human Development Report, Somalia 1998:
http://www.unsomalia.org
11 Nkrumah, Gamal: "Battling Africaís Colonial
Legacy," Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 381, June 11-17, 1998 http://163.121.16/weekly/1998/381/in1.htm
12 Durch, William, et al: UN Peacekeeping,
American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, St. Martinís Press,
New York City, New York,1995
13 Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry,
http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol1/v1c11e.htm
14 UN Human Development Report, Somalia 1998:
http://www.unsomalia.org
15 Davis, Michael, and Pitsch, Anne: Tutsi
and Hutu in Rwanda, July 21, 1997: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/rwanda.htm
16 Human Rights Watch Report: Genocide in
Rwanda
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-04.htm#P95_39230
17 Human Development Report, 1999: http://www.undp.org/hdro/HDI.html
18 Power, Jonathan: "The Congo--It is not
Africa's First World War; It is Tribalism," November 25, 1998, http://www.oneworld.org/analysis/jonatpower/25nov98.html