Those who have never studied Cuban history most likely
do not know that Fidel Castro, the Marxist-Leninist dictator of Cuba, was
once on friendly terms with the United States. But even those who
do know the history of U.S.-Cuban relations often forget that the relationship
between the bitter enemies was rather cordial during the first half of
1959. Castro traveled to the United States in April, categorically
denied he was a Communist, and voiced disagreement with the Communist system.
His avowed goal for Cuba was to install a democracy that provided both
bread and freedom for the Cuban people.1
What was it that turned Castro from Western democracy and capitalism to the Soviet Union and Marxist-Leninism? How did a man who was not even a member of the Cuban Communist Party indoctrinate himself and embrace the very ideology that his 26th of July movement disdained? After all, most of Castroís followers, including Ernesto "Che" Guevara, viewed Cuban Communists with contempt because the Communists had not participated in the Revolution. A comment often heard among fidelistas was that "we fought the Revolution while the Communists hid safely under their beds."2 The Communist Party was equally suspicious of Castro. From the beginning of the Revolution, they had opposed Castroís struggle, "calling it putschist and adventurist."3
This study explores commonly accepted reasons that Castro turned to the Soviet Union for assistance. It analyzes the most widely accepted arguments for this fundamental change, as well as alternatives to these interpretations. I provide a critique of U.S. foreign policy, which many argue, accelerated and intensified Castroís Marxist-Leninist policy, and I will show how Castroís desire to export his Revolution to the rest of Latin America triggered his sudden ideological transformation.
Scholars who attempt to understand why Castro turned Communist generally rely on four main theories. The first theory is that Fidel Castro never switched sides: he was a Communist all along.4 The second theory argues that Castroís overnight conversion to Marxism-Leninism was a direct result of U.S reaction to his revolution and subsequent policy toward Cuba.5 Another rationale holds that Castroís decision to declare the Cuban Revolution socialist in nature was the result of a series of events occurring between the United States and Cuba that led to a rapid escalation of hostilities culminating in the severance of formal diplomatic ties.6 The final theory concludes that Castroís gravitation toward the Soviet Union was a function of his principle foreign policy objective of liberating Latin America, a policy in direct contention with the United States.7
In the years since Fidel Castroís publicized allegiance to socialist doctrine, some have claimed that he was a communist from the beginning of his revolutionary career. Accepted and disseminated largely by his opponents in the United States, this theory, in its most extreme form, holds that Castro was earlier employed by the Soviets as a communist agent in Mexico at the age of twenty-one. Many of Castroís enemies, including the American ambassador to Cuba, Earl Smith, saw his shift to the left in the fall of 1959 as proof that they had been correct all along. "Castro," it was said, "had always been a Communist who had temporarily concealed his hostility to the United States to give his regime the breathing space it needed to solidify control and ensure Cubaís delivery into the hands of the Kremlin."8
Scholars who subscribe to this theory find evidence not only in the actions of Castro, but also in his words. Castro proclaimed in a televised speech on December 2, 1961, that he had been a Marxist while in the Sierra Maestra and had already been planning to implement a Marxist program. "He had," he said, "not informed the Cuban people of these plans at the time because they were not ready to evaluate them properly."9
On closer look, however, it seems that this analysis overlooks key events and disregards Castroís own lack of commitment to Communism in the months leading up to the Cuban switch. As he came to power, Castro consistently denied any Communist sympathies, links, or intention of adopting a Soviet model for Cuba. He stated, "We are against all kinds of dictatorships, whether of a man, of a country, or a class, or an oligarchy, or the military. That is why weíre against Communism."10 Moreover, Castroís revolution did not receive any real support from the official Cuban Communist Party, the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP). The Communists were even concerned when Castro, at the time of his trip to the United States showed evidence of a friendly attitude toward the United States. Communist dogma held that the mere presence of a Latin American statesman in the U.S. capital was unspeakable treason. Even after Castro declared his allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, he first purged most of the old PSP members and handed the reins over to members of his 26th of July movement.
Perhaps even more telling was the fact that the CIA had done a complete background check on Fidel during the Revolution in 1957, and their assessment had turned up nothing to link Castro to the PSP or Moscow.11 On November 7, 1959 Deputy CIA Director General C. P. Cabell testified before the Senate Internal Security Committee: "Our information shows that the Cuban Communists do not consider [Castro] a Communist Party member, or even a pro-Communist . . . . [They] consider Castro as a representative of the bourgeoisie, and were unable to gain public recognition or commitments from him during the course of the revolution."12 Perhaps Castro was not a Communist from day one. If not, then what caused his sudden ideological change?
When confronted with the question of how Castroís revolution turned away from democracy, some scholars look to defective U.S. foreign policy for answers. Probably the most widely accepted explanation for Castroís shift regards the U.S refusal to accept Castroís economic and social reforms as the cause of Fidelís transformation. Much is made of an official note of protest from the Eisenhower Administration to Castro in June 1959 which raised questions about the compensation feature of the new agrarian-reforms Castro was putting into law. Such U.S. reactions of demonstrated that Washington would not tolerate Cuban reforms that could potentially lead to the expropriation of U.S. companies. Understanding U.S. sentiment, Castro concluded that if he was to carry out his revolutionary program, he would have to break with the U.S. and turn to the Soviets for help and assistance. Another possible concern was the precedent of U.S. intervention in Guatemala in 1954.13 It was no secret that the United States had historically viewed reformist regimes, such as the of the Arbenz administration in Guatemala, with intense antagonism, and this could be sufficient reason to give credence to the assumption that the United States would react no differently to Cuba.
Even so, the United States initially displayed more openness to change in Cuba than one might have expected. The United States even appointed Philip Bonsal, who made a sincere effort to establish a positive and open rapport with Cubaís new leaders, as U.S. ambassador to Cuba. Furthermore, during Castroís trip to the U.S. in April 1959, the U.S. supported the basic principles of [agrarian] reform. And the infamous note from Washington to Castro implied that Cuba could count on United States compliance with such a law, despite reservations dealing with some of the provisions in the new reform law. These factors make it difficult to position the blame for deterioration of U.S.-Cuban relations solely on the shoulders of the Americans. As we will see, others argue that there are two sides to every story, and Cuban-American relations were modified as a result of mistakes and miscalculations on both sides.
The third theory regarding Castroís adoption of a Marxist-Leninist philosophy holds that a series of conflicts occurred between the United States and Cuba which led to a rapid escalation of hostilities. According to this theory, the result was Castroís adoption of Soviet-style communism.
The first clash between Cuba and the United States came in early January 1960 over the issue of political trials. U.S. press reports on the trials of members of the Batista regime in Cuba raised a furor in the United States. The American press was filled with editorials condemning the trials and several U.S. senators urged the imposition of a trade embargo against Cuba.14 However, the Cuban people demanded vindication against the Batista officials and the situation worsened.
Not all who were tried were convicted, and some of the convicted even received light sentences. While voices in Washington publicly discussed the means available for punishing Castro, the Eisenhower Administration was more circumspect in its response, and looked to diplomatic means to express its concerns. Castro, however, was unable or unwilling to discern the difference, and in an apparent act of defiance, challenged his critics to come to Cuba and witness the trials firsthand.
Castro never masked his disdain for American imperialism. His bold proclamations in defiance of the United States continued and it appears that within months, the Eisenhower Administration came to regard Castroís words as a direct threat to U.S. international prestige. Castroís Agrarian Land Reform became another point of contention between Washington and Havana. While not immediately clear what effect the law would have on U.S. holdings in Cuba, the American public responded swiftly and negatively by condemning the Castro regime. Again, the Eisenhower Administration was not as quick to jump to conclusions in response to the new law. The American press, much like the American public, charged that Cuba was going Communist. Meanwhile, the United States sent the Castro Government an official note of protest. However, the note did not suggest that Washington opposed the idea of land reform in Cuba, rather it supported the need for adjustments in the Cuban socioeconomic structure. What it did demand was "prompt, adequate and effective compensation"15 for any affected American property. The question of how prompt the compensation would be offered became another area of disagreement. Because of strong domestic and international pressures, neither Washington nor Havana seemed willing to compromise on the issue of compensation.
What followed Castroís pessimism regarding compromise with the Americans were several events aimed directly at liberating Cuba from U.S. imperialism. As early as December 1959, the CIA had begun to "interview possible recruits among the Cuban exile community in Florida and to plan for the selection and training of an instructor cadre,"16 likely sounding alarm bells in Havana. Little did the Americans know that intelligence worked both ways. It was only natural for Fidel to have eyes and ears in Florida, just as the CIA did in Havana. On July 6, 1960, Eisenhower ordered a 700,000-ton cut in Cubaís sugar quota of 3,120,000. In Havana, government officials denounced Eisenhowerís order as an example of economic warfare and illegal interference in Cuban domestic affairs. As expected, the Cubans secured from the Soviets a promise to increase their sugar imports to offset the American reduction. In August and September of the same year, Castro authorized seizures of U.S. investments in manufacturing, commerce, finance, and transportation. This move, combined with the earlier expropriations of U.S.-owned properties in agriculture and mining "effectively eliminated U.S. property ownership in Cuba."17
Some scholars look to Fidel Castroís foreign policy agenda for answers to the question of why Cuba "went communist". These scholars argue that Castroís objectives were largely international in scope, and while he fully intended to "liberate" Cuba, he hoped to take the rest of Latin America with him. One of Castroís most sympathetic chroniclers noted: "There is . . . a Messiah complex. Fidel has all along felt himself to be a crusader, if not a savior. He is out to achieve a second liberation of Latin America."18
Castro was no dummy. He knew that his pursuits in Latin America were likely to steer him into a confrontation with the United States. Castro also realized that while the U.S. might tolerate his domestic programs, his foreign policy was another matter. He originally hoped that Latin America would unite behind the Cuban example and liberation would follow in due course. However, when other revolutions did not occur in Latin America, the Soviets were chosen as the back-up plan to protect Cuba from U.S. aggression.
According to Wayne Smith, a former U.S. diplomat in Cuba, by the latter half of 1959, Castro was forced to reassess the Latin American situation. There were no other budding revolutions. And where he tried to help revolutions along, he failed. Castro also drew conclusions from an August 1959 OAS (Organization of American States) meeting in which the principle of nonintervention was reaffirmed. The Inter-American Peace Committee of the OAS was also directed to take steps to prevent one state from attempting to overthrow the government of another state. Castroís time and options were running out. New Cuban efforts in support of insurgents in other Latin American nations would surely be met with force. Says Smith,
"Castroís prospects must have appeared to him bleak indeed. If he continued to pursue his objectives in Latin America, he would find himself all alone face to face with the most powerful nation in the world. His alternatives were to give up his foreign-policy objectives, or to seek a shield against U.S. power. A credible shield required a powerful ally. To which of the worldís powers could Castro turn with any hope that his request would be honored?" Enter the Soviets. Obviously, they were the only nation with the power and the will to undercut the influence of the Americans in Latin America."19
According to Carla Anne Robbins, author of The Cuban Threat, Castroís foreign policy was not limited merely to the export of his revolution. Castro also promoted another diplomatic form of internationalism: "a new view of Third World development based on ideals of equity and autonomy for small states, to be won through aggressive organization and bargaining."20 According to Robbins, Castroís commitment to Third World development was in many ways as radical and as challenging to the traditional domination of the superpowers (both Washington and Moscow) as any of its commitments to armed struggle. Castroís pledge to promote development in the Third World was a major source of tension in the Cuban-Soviet alliance, which discredits theories that hold that Castro was always Communist.
In Richard E Welchís book, Response to Revolution, Welch argues that Castro intended to pursue a non-aligned, neutral stance. "Initially he believed neutralism in the Cold War would be sufficient to the needs of Cuban self determination; subsequently he opted for an alliance with the Soviet Union."21 Welch believes that Castro opted for Soviet alliance which would "create a new form of dependence," but it was a different and more malleable form of dependence. "It was the self-assessed needs of revolutionary Cuba rather than the diplomatic ambitions of the Soviet Union that would draw the Cuban Revolution into the power conflicts of the Cold War," says Welch.22 He believes that it was largely Castroís foreign policy agendas that led him to adopt Soviet ideology.
Castro turned to the Soviets as a last resort. For as important as Soviet aid was to Cubaís survival, Castro did not hesitate to criticize his Soviet allies "when Soviet policies appeared to diverge from Cuban ideals of internationalist behavior."23 In fact, Havanaís ideological commitment to revolution and Third World development was so strong that Castro was willing to stake everything on it, including Cubaís alliance with the Soviet Union. In the end, Cuba even succeeded in alienating many of its Latin American brethren in its quests to fulfill Fidelís prophecies. "And, most tellingly, the Cubans were willing to place great strains on their relations with the Latin American Communist parties . . . for the sake of continental revolution."24 It was not until the eve of the Bay of Pigs invasion, after all, that Castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist. He knew that an invasion was on the way, and he made the public declaration as if to say to the Soviets, "I am a good Marxist-Leninist just like you; if the Americans attack me, you must come to my defense."25
This evidence points to two conclusions. First, Castro was, at least in the first years of his revolution, a communist by necessity, and only to the point that was required for continued Soviet support.26 Secondly, Castroís foreign policy was the reason he made the switch away from democracy. While it is likely that U.S. foreign policy aggravated relations between the United States and Cuba, it was not the principle reason that Castro turned Communist. The following pages will look at the role of U.S. foreign policy in the context of the Cuban switch.
Antagonism between Havana and Washington had a direct impact on Castroís Russian policy. On May 7, 1960, Cuba and the USSR established diplomatic relations, and by the summer of 1960, the Soviets were beginning to supply most of Cubaís petroleum needs. As a result, "on June 7, 1960, Esso, Texaco and the British oil company Shell, refused to refine Soviet crude oil imported by the Cuban government."27 Cuba responded by nationalizing all three oil refineries. The U.S. Congress, in turn, authorized the termination of Cubaís sugar quota, and on July 6, President Eisenhower announced that the U.S. would not purchase the 700,000 tons of Cuban sugar remaining in the 1960 quota.
Of course, Cuba reacted swiftly and radically. On August 6, Cuba nationalized all U.S.-owned industrial and agrarian enterprises, followed by a September 17 nationalization of all U.S-owned banks on the island. Finally, on October 19, the U.S. imposed a partial trade embargo on Cuba that prohibited all exports except food and medicines. This escalating animosity between Fidelís regime and the U.S. "encouraged both the radicalization of the Cuban Revolution and Castroís search for Soviet support."28
This does not mean, however, that the United States was the cause of Castroís shift. Washington did not force Fidel to adopt socialism or a revolutionary dictatorship any more than it forced Castroís alliance with the Soviet Union. American policy merely encouraged the inevitable. Castro simply capitalized on the animosity between Cuba and the United States to forge closer links abroad with a Russian government eager to promote a Soviet presence in the Caribbean. According to Richard Welch:
"Castro found U.S. antagonism a useful rallying cry for revolutionaries at home as well as an effective argument for support from abroad. Conciliation of the United States would not only undermine his authority among radical revolutionaries in Cuba but destroy his diplomatic leverage with Soviet bloc nations and lessen his appeal for potential revolutionaries in Latin America."29
In other words, United States actions do not furnish the primary explanation of the course of the Cuban Revolution. They merely facilitated its radical transformation. Castroís decision to proclaim identification with the Soviet Union was determined only in part by the United States; by injuries received and anticipated from the U.S.
Indeed, many argue that Castroís foreign and domestic goals would have eventually landed him in the lap of the Soviets. This may in fact be true, however at the very least, U.S. economic sanctions hastened the evolution of the Cuban-Russian alliance. And while it may be difficult to prove or disprove this argument, another important effect of U.S. Cuban policy is not as easy to discredit. One of the most important results of U.S. policy was that it helped Castro convince the Cuban people of the necessity of turning the revolution leftward. It also helped Castro persuade Cubans that the United States was public enemy number one, and actually furthered the centralization of the Cuban political system which also accelerated the formation of the Cuban-Russian alliance. "By intervening in the Cuban class struggle," argues one scholar, "the United States made the Revolution stronger by making it patriotic."30 It was convenient to have an external threat against which to rally the Cuban people.
Of course, it also did not hurt that the Soviets were applauding Cubaís quests for independence from the United States at the same time. When Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, arrived in Havana in 1960, he saluted the Cubans in their "desire for independence."31 And while the United States pointed out that Cuba would suffer a loss of needed investment due to the ongoing confrontation between Washington and Havana, Mikoyan signed an agreement giving Cuba a credit of $100,000,000 for the purchase of equipment, machinery, materials, and technical services. Cuba could repay this credit over a twelve-year period at 2 1/2 percent interest with sugar and other Cuban products. Mikoyan also stated that the USSR wanted to help small states like Cuba gain respect for their national sovereignty, while the U.S. threatened action if Cuba embraced communism. This gentle stroking of Fidelís ego doubtless helped illustrate to Castro the sharpening of sentiments in Washington and the new willingness of the Soviets to back Castroís Cuba.
According to Wayne Smith, Fidelís drive to export his revolution, coupled with historical tensions between the United States and Cuba, and U.S. foreign policy regarding Cuba, caused Castro to adopt Marxism-Leninism. Smith believes it would be impossible to separate these factors. Says Smith,
"The gulf between the United States and Castroís Cuba is not imaginary. Castroís early goals were nothing less than to extend revolution throughout Latin America and in the process to challenge U.S. influence. In response to this out-thrusting on Castroís part, [the U.S.] felt [it] had to "contain" Cuba. It was this mix of his goals and our reaction to them that led Castro to align with the Soviet Union."32
The interaction of these factors in the radicalization of the Cuban Revolution was complex. No single component determined the course of affirming Cuban independence and the subsequent alignment with the Soviets. Fidel was committed to Cuba libre, and the United States was determined not to let a small island nation 90 miles off the coast destroy its reputation. These facts obviously contributed to Castroís rejection of democracy and free-market capitalism. However, it was not the United States that single-handedly delivered the Cubans to the Soviet Union. That alone offers an insufficient explanation. For to disregard Castroís foreign policy agenda would be to ignore the significance of U.S. reaction to his foreign policy, which is critical to understanding the evolution of not only Castroís ideology, but also the relationship between the United States and Cuba.
Castroís other revolutions failed. His master plan of liberating Latin America from U.S. imperialism and of creating a "third?world order" in which he would be the ideological god did not happen with the speed that he had hoped for. He knew that he was coming ever closer to a face-to-face confrontation with the United States. And alone, Castro knew he would lose. In order to further his goals, Castro turned to the one place he knew he could get help: the Soviet Union. He did so not because the U.S.S.R. was his ideological soulmate. He did so to protect himself and Cuba.
There was no going back. The United States, if ever inclined to make deals with Fidel, certainly lost such inclinations upon Castroís alignment with the enemy. The CIA began its infamous Bay of Pigs plan. The American press showed no mercy with regards to dramatizing the "Cuban threat." Meanwhile, the Castro government grew increasingly convinced that the only answer to Cubaís problems was falling completely for Soviet style Communism.
Where does all of this leave us today? The enemy has fallen, and we have won the ideological war. Can we not establish diplomatic relations with Cuba and end the embargo? Certainly, the Cuban "threat" has vanished. Or has it? We have, as a nation, reached out to China, North Korea and Vietnam. Cuba is the last active battleground of the Cold War, and the United States is making no great overtures to improve relations with Havana. Since getting rid of Castro is not a viable option, it would seem pertinent to ask the question: What are we gaining by continuing the embargo against Cuba? To attempt to establish formal relations with Cuba would not imply that we like Castro or that we somehow lost the fight against Cuba. To do so would be to take a step in the right direction, just as we have done with North Korea, Vietnam, and China, and begin to deal sensibly with the Cuban "problem."
Footnotes
1 New York Times,
April 17, 1969.
2 Smith, Wayne S. The
Closest of Enemies (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1987), p.
43.
3 Carla Anne Robbins,
The Cuban Threat (Philadelphia: ISHI Publications, 1985) p. 27.
4 American Ambassadors
to Cuba, Earl Smith and Arthur Gardner argued that Castro had been a Communist
all along. See Smith, p. 44. See also Daniel James, Cuba:
The First Soviet Satellite in the Americas (New York: Avon Books,
1961).
5 Maurice Zeitlin
and Robert Scheer, Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere (New York: Grove
Press, 1963); or Joseph P. Morray, The Second Revolution in Cuba (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1962).
6 Richard E. Welch
Jr., Response to Revolution (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1985.)
7 See Smith,
The Closest of Enemies, and Robbins, The Cuban Threat.
8 Robbins, The Cuban
Threat p. 73. For a review of other scholars that acknowledge
this theory, see Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1983), p. 44; Richard E. Welch, Response to Revolution
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985) p. 11.
9 Smith, The Closest
of Enemies , p. 45.
10 New York Times, 3 March
1958, p. 11.
11 See Smith, p. 44.
12 Zeitlin and Scheer, p. 111.
13 For a detailed statement
of this view see Maurice Zeitlin and Robert Scheer, Cuba: Tragedy in Our
Hemisphere (New York: Grove Press, 1963); or Joseph P. Morray, The
Second Revolution in Cuba (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962).
14 See Robbins, p. 79-82.
15 New York Times, June
12, 1959.
16 Richard E. Welch Jr.,
Response to Revolution (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1985.) p. 48-49.
17 Ibid., p. 51.
18 Herbert Matthews, The
Cuban Story (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p. 191.
19 Smith, p. 51.
20 Robbins, p. 58.
21 Welch, p. 21.
22 Ibid., p. 21?22.
23 Robbins, p. 44.
24 Ibid., p. 53.
25 Smith, p. 54.
26 Many scholars argue
that over the years, Castro transformed into a full-fledged Marxist-Leninist,
however on the eve of the Bay of Pigs invasion, he did so purely out of
the need for Soviet protection. See Wayne Smith, p. 54. Richard
E. Welch, Response to Revolution; and J. P. Morray, The Second Revolution
in Cuba, (New York: MR Press, 1962); Andres Suarez, Cuba: Castroism
and communism, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967).
27 Smith, p. 57.
28 Welch, p. 22.
29 Ibid., p. 24.
30 Morray, p. 95.
31 Ibid., 93.
32 Smith, p. 278.