Breaking Baghdad:
American National Security Interests in Iraq, 1953-1955

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**Introduction**

Iraq’s history reaches much farther back than the average American likely recognizes. This history has been lost, replaced with a grim, and unfortunately all too real, perspective. For many young Americans, Iraq is nothing more than a war-torn country once subject to decades of despotism by Saddam Hussein. Images of the Iraq War occupied the televisions of millions of Americans, beginning with shock and awe, a triumph and exposition of American military power, and culminating in the withdrawal of troops after a decade-long battle. Today, Iraq is experiencing violence in a civil war that surpasses, in magnitude, much of the problems and bloodshed that existed prior to the 2003 invasion. For many Americans, this begs the question as to whether or not the war was successful and, most importantly, worth the effort and sacrifices of American military forces.

While the Iraq War will assuredly be a controversial and much studied topic for years to come, I am focusing my efforts elsewhere. The latest invasion is simply an extension of American foreign policy in the Middle East that has been developing in Washington for decades. Before 2003, before 1991, before Saddam, there was the Cold War. It was within that context that American influence reached out to the deserts and mountains of the Middle East, a place long believed not to be vital to U.S. national security.

After the penetration of the United States into the Middle East, a complex set of defense alliances and pacts were pursued in order to prevent Soviet influence. That pursuit often fell flat, undermined by deep-seated resentment of the West and poor policy decisions by the British government, such as a blatant disregard for the Palestinian situation and Arab concern over it and blunt use of force to achieve national goals. Yet there was one construction that seemed to offer a glimmer of hope for the U.S.: the Baghdad Pact. Consisting of Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, and Great Britain—and chiefly orchestrated by the
United States—the Pact was envisioned as a defense apparatus against the northern Soviet power. Militarily, it was understood to be too weak to actually prevent an offensive by the Soviets, but this was not an expected course of action that the Kremlin would take; rather, the Pact was symbolic and revealed the true interest and loyalty of the Middle East elite.

Iraq, a long ignored country within the Middle East, became the linchpin to the Pact. The country showed promise of being a strong, dependable ally in a region that suffered from massive instability; furthermore, the bulk of the population in the Middle East expressed a resounding rejection of Western operations. By examining the Baghdad Pact, which spearheaded American policy in the region in the 1950s, reveals much about U.S. national security interests in Iraq and the region more broadly. Defending the Middle East was the surface argument presented to Iraq and the other signatories of the Pact, yet “defense” can be understood in various ways. There is the classic, militaristic conception of defense. Then there is a more nuanced, economic and ideological conception of defense. It is the latter in which America was most interested.

Through my research I show that American national security interests in Iraq were economic and ideological, catalyzed by the fear that Soviet influence in the country would spread throughout the Arab world. Furthermore, this would result in the blocking of important markets that were necessary for the rebuilding of Western Europe, which was in turn vital to the health of the global capitalist economy. Through exploring America’s entrance into the Middle East, the subsequent effort to arm Iraq, and then the orchestration of a defense alliance that came to be the Baghdad Pact, the motives for America’s involvement in the region are revealed with the utmost clarity.
Before presenting my research, I want to establish what this essay is not aimed at. I am not putting forth an argument as to whether or not the broad strategy of intervening in the Middle East that Washington employed was flawed. I am also not interested in debating what should be taken into consideration when making decisions regarding national security nor am I going to bring the Baghdad Pact into that debatable subject. Additionally, recognizing that there is plenty of passion surrounding the structure of the international economic system, I am not making implied value judgments when discussing capitalism or socialism. Rather, this article strives to reveal why America was so interested in the Middle East and Iraq. Through my research I show that American national security interests in Iraq were economic and ideological, catalyzed by the fear that Soviet influence in the country would spread throughout the Arab world. Furthermore, this would result in the blocking of important markets that were necessary for the rebuilding of Western Europe, which was in turn vital to the health of the global capitalist economy. Through exploring America’s entrance into the Middle East, the subsequent effort to arm Iraq, and then the orchestration of a defense alliance that came to be the Baghdad Pact, the motives for America’s involvement in the region are revealed with the utmost clarity.

Moving In: The United States and the Middle East Post-WWII

It is widely understood that prior to WWII, Britain was the dominant force in the Middle East. Certainly, the French were also influential in the region when the Middle East is understood to include North Africa, as well. Precisely because of the stronghold the British and French held in the region, as well as preoccupation of the U.S. elsewhere (Latin America, Asia, and then post-war Europe), American involvement in the Middle East was not seen as vital to its
national security by those who influenced the foreign policy the most. Additionally, the U.S. had been self-sufficient in oil for decades, and the increasing production of oil in the Middle East did not have the same lure as it did for the British, who needed it for economic survival. There was little incentive for the United States to move in and influence the region when the West already had a largely unchallenged presence. By the 1950s, however, this had changed for a multitude of reasons.

First, Britain’s operation in the Middle East was outdated and quickly becoming ineffective. Their policy was unclear, premised on a set of pacts and alliances that had little to no overarching theme holding them together. With rising nationalism in the Arab world, this policy became less feasible. As Harold B. Hoskins, a senior diplomat in the State Department, wrote in 1952, “It is hard for many Americans…to realize how general and how deep-seated is the distrust and in some cases hatred for the British and French because of their past or present colonial policies and activities.” This is not to say that, prior to WWII, nationalism was not present in the Middle East; for example, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was extremely unpopular amongst a majority of Iraqis for that very reason. Popular resentment of a Western imperial presence was widespread. However, nationalism truly began to gain legitimacy after WWII due to international support. The United Nations’ Charter is certainly revelatory of this environment; while many of the Great Powers were yet to fully commit to giving up their colonial ambitions, much of the world was ready for such a change. Additionally, the destruction in Europe by Total War meant that Britain lacked the resources it needed to maintain its empire abroad. The challenge of nationalism, therefore, became exponentially more difficult to handle for the British, since it could not be suppressed
without international condemnation and suppression, and resources. Most evidently for the U.K., India’s independence of 1947 proved that the sun was setting on its empire.

Second, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a true world power after WWII caused a refocusing of U.S. national security interests. The Middle East was—in the view of the American government—at risk of falling to the Soviet Union due its economic problems and political instability. The United States believed countries that were instable and poor were more likely to be susceptible to the propaganda of the USSR, and in turn more likely to be targets of the Soviet Union’s aggressive foreign policy. As an intelligence report provided by the CIA in 1951 asserted, “The USSR…undoubtedly consider(s) that favorable and subversive opportunities exist in the Near and Far East, where the decline of Western influence and control as created serious instability.”

The fear of the Soviet Union expanding where the British were shrinking absolutely consumed Washington. In perhaps the most influential government document of the Cold War, in 1950 the National Security Council declared in NSC 68:

Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historic distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, anti-thetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.

However, this alleged Soviet expansion needs to be qualified in order to truly understand what America’s concerns. In 1952, the Counselor of the State Department and Senior Staff member on the National Security Council, Charles Bohlen, reviewed NSC 68 and 114; in his review there were certain truths about the USSR that he unequivocally believed. Among those truths was that the Soviets would attack the U.S. if they could do so without
suffering a serious blow to their own regime. Yet this is not necessarily shocking; in a realist international system, this is a rather easy assumption to make when looking at the USSR and U.S. as bitter ideological rivals competing for resources and power. This language, which portrayed the USSR as a looming threat, was more of a political tactic, used in order to scare politicians and frighten the public. With this leverage, a budget that would enable America’s expansion into the Middle East and other regions would be more attainable.

While the United States argued that the Soviet Union would attack if it could survive a retaliatory blow, at the same time it fully recognized that the conditions they considered necessary in order for a Soviet attack to be feasible were far from a reality. The United States had more than enough military power to deliver a lethal blow to the Soviet regime. Therefore, the State Department estimated that “cold war” policies—undermining Western interests abroad using political and economic strategies—were the most likely course of action for the USSR. Charles Bohlen also wrote, after his previous inflammatory rhetoric, that “Soviet action is more likely to be confined to the ‘cold war’—i.e., a continuous hostility and a pushing and probing toward an exploitation of all Western weaknesses.” This statement reveals the true stance of Charles Bohlen, hidden behind the bombastic language of many in the State Department, especially Secretary Dulles, and in the NSC. Even in NSC 68, the documented strategy that formed so much of the Cold War policies in America, it was asserted: “It is quite clear from Soviet theory and practice that the Kremlin seeks to bring the free world under its dominion by the methods of the cold war.”

The understanding in Washington that the Soviet Union was averse to military conflict with the West is significant because when understood in this way it redefines the principles of American interests in the Middle East, shifting them away from traditional national defense
interests. The U.S. was not interested in defending this region against a military strike—although that was certainly discussed—because it was not likely to occur. While the USSR maintained troops in Iran after the British and Americans withdrew, that military presence was a remainder from WWII. Bullets and bombs were simply not the method by which the Soviet Union was feared to expand, at least not in the Middle East. It was, instead, through propaganda and economic incentives that the Kremlin would make its headway into the region. This would aid the Soviets in broadening their sphere and, in turn, block crucial markets to the U.S. and West. These included oil markets, which were absolutely crucial for the rebuilding of Western Europe. Loy Henderson, a Foreign Service Officer who worked many years in the U.S. Near Eastern Affairs Department, recalled in 1973 the potential for losing oil in the Middle East during the beginning of the Cold War: “[A]n unfriendly power in possession of the great Middle East oil reserves could hamper the rehabilitation of Western Europe and retard the economic development of Africa and Southern Asia.”

This potential problem sets up the third reason for a changing dynamic in the Middle East: market access meant the ability to rebuild Western Europe’s economy and military forces, which was the paramount concern for the U.S. after WWII and was revealed through the neglect of the punitive aspect of JCS 1067, and, of course, the execution of the Marshall Plan. JCS 1067 was originally intended to limit Germany’s war making ability and armament industry; however, through various revisions, its implementation, and then eventual replacement with JCS 1779, American policy in Germany shifted its aim toward restoring a stable Germany. Defense of its allied partners played a role in the decision as well, which Willard Thorp, the Assistant Secretary to the Secretary of State, intimately tied into rebuilding Western Europe: “The practical purpose of the [National Petroleum] program [in the U.S.]
would be to assure adequate supplies of oil in the event of a major war. It is generally agreed that the problem would be acute if Middle East oil supplies should be lost.\textsuperscript{xiv} Western Europe was destroyed by war and this presented a problem to the United States, which had become the leader in the international capitalist economic system. Open markets, free trade, and the division of labor were necessary abroad in order for the U.S. to be successful at home. Of course, Western Europe had the dominant economies before the war, and therefore needed to recover to save the global markets.\textsuperscript{xv} NSC 68 again provides insight into this line of thinking by the United States: “The European Recovery Program has been successful in assisting the restoration and expansion of production in Western Europe… However, little progress has been made toward the resumption by Western Europe of a position of influence in world affairs commensurate with its potential strength.”\textsuperscript{xvi}

To fully restore Western Europe, though, oil was needed and therefore the markets of the Middle East were now significantly tied to the interests of American national security as their product could help Western Europe recover from the ruins of war. Again, it was not domestic consumption that was attractive. David Painter, professor of international history at Georgetown University, writes: “The rebuilding of Western Europe and Japan had emerged as a critical element in the U.S. strategy of containing the Soviet Union; accordingly, assuring a supply of oil for these areas became a key U.S. objective… With U.S. an even Venezuelan production increasingly needed to satisfy burgeoning U.S. demand, the Middle East was…the logical place” for America.\textsuperscript{xvii} Certainly, there were other reasons for the U.S. to want to gain and maintain access to the oil: American businesses could profit from the overseas production by securing contracts to the oil fields. Stanley Andrews, the director of the Point IV program from 1952-1953, remembered the economic interest that so many in Washington were
preoccupied with: “That hundred million dollars for the Middle East, I didn't know at the
time, was put in there by the people in the State Department who were interested in the oil
deal, and the big oil companies to protect this oil in the Middle East.”xviii These oil companies
had a history of operating in the Middle East and had worked hand-in-hand with the U.S.
government throughout WWII to ensure their operations remained in tact.xix However, when
countries nationalized their oil industries, such as Iran in 1951, it became even more
important for the U.S. to gain control of the region for its own national interest. Without
influence—and perhaps even more dangerously with Soviet influence—the United States
would suffer a blow to its rebuilding project in Western Europe.

The problem was compounded because while Britain lost its grip on the Middle East,
American national security interests shifted away from London’s. Therefore, while America
could rely on the British prior to WWII, the situation had changed. Not only was Britain’s
strength dwindling, but its policy objectives and motivations ceased to align as neatly with
those of the United States; America was not interested in controlling the Middle East in order
to maintain its own prestige and empire, as its position as world hegemon was really just
beginning. Prestige and empire were the concerns of Britain, as Clement Attlee identified
these problems in 1947: “We shall constantly appear to be supporting vested interests and
reaction against reform and revolution in the interests of the poor.”xxx Again, for the U.S.,
Middle Eastern policy was formulated to contain communism in order to win the global war
of ideologies and to protect market access worldwide. Containment of the USSR in order to
keep the global capitalist economy intact, as well as to make room for the U.S. to expand
itself, preoccupied American policy makers in Washington.xxi
While the history of American-Soviet relations is complicated—and one can rightly see that the origins of the Cold War cannot be explained simply with a Soviets-as-the-protagonist narrative—the subject of Soviet aggression in its foreign policy must be clarified. Many have made the argument that the Soviet Union was not actively expanding outward, that it was not seeking an aggressive policy in the Middle East. There is an argument that the U.S. completely fabricated the threat of the Soviet Union, using the communist threat demagogically in order to create a new enemy after WWII. While there is no doubt that the inflammatory rhetoric of the United States regarding the USSR was a tactic to generate support for bigger budgets and was used as a justification for interfering in the affairs of other nations, this does not mean that there was not a Soviet effort to expand. It would have been very difficult to completely inaccurately create the USSR threat without some truth. The view that the Soviet Union was dormant in the Middle East is grossly oversimplified. It is also misleading to claim that the Soviet Union posed no threat to the U.S. While the USSR was not likely to attack with a military strike, undermining free markets certainly would have impacted the American economy.

There are numerous examples of the Soviets meddling in the Middle East; this is not a condemnation of their foreign policy. In fact, it is quite the contrary. It made perfect sense for the USSR to take a serious interest in the Middle East due to its proximity. Considering that Western powers had been historically dominant there but Britain was slowly losing power in the region, an opportunity was created for the Soviets. As early as the 1920s, immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution, the USSR pursued a foreign policy in the Middle East that was aimed at securing its own national interests. It is true that this was in part to counter Western aggression toward the Bolsheviks, but to entirely dismiss the activity in Afghanistan
in the 1920s, for example, is disingenuous. This type of activity in the Middle East continued when in 1936 the Soviet Union sought control of the straits in the Black Sea, which was granted by a convention dominated by Western powers to Turkey instead. In 1945, the USSR made the supposed automatic renewal of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925 with Turkey conditional. The Soviets sought control over the Kars and Ardahan regions, as well as upon the inclusion of the USSR in the defense of the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The USSR sought to gain influence elsewhere in the region as well, such as demanding a trusteeship over Libya in 1945 and continuing pressure on Turkey and Iran. When both of these countries moved closer to the West, the Soviets turned their attention toward Afghanistan again and eventually Egypt. While the Soviet Union was not as successful as the West in the Middle East during the early years of the Cold War, it is easy to conflate this failure with a lack of a presence. That confusion distorts the actual geo-political battle that took place in the Middle East between the Great Powers after WWII.

By 1952, the State Department had recognized that “over the past several years” the status and prestige of the U.K. had been declining in the Middle East and that “the U.S. must in its own interest take more initiative than it has to date in the determination of policies relative to the area.” That interest was the containment of communism, stopping the USSR from penetrating the Middle East, and taking advantage of the feverish nationalist movements therein. Furthermore, the U.S. wanted to stop the nationalist movements altogether, as they posed a threat to the access to markets. Hoskins wrote at the time, “In the field of growing nationalism, the US must take fuller advantage of the almost automatic assumption of many people of the area that the US is sympathetic to people everywhere who are striving to obtain
This would take policies that differed from previous British policies, though. Or, in the least, a presentation and approach that appeared less imperialistic.

The United States then began to increase activity in the Middle East. The first public show of leadership was in 1946, when the U.S. demanded the USSR to withdraw forces out of Iran. Mostly at this time, though, the American government was influencing the region with still limited technical and economic assistance. For instance, beginning in 1947 the U.S. began to supply Turkey with military equipment and related aid that by 1956 would amount to more than the U.K. had delivered to the armies of all the countries of the Middle East since World War I. Certainly, the United States’ efforts were bold enough to draw the attention of the Soviet Union, who criticized the U.S. as having “imperialist aims” that were “masked by talk of technical and cultural assistance.” Other programs, such as the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and Truman’s Point Four program left room for discretion as to where significant funding went; eventually, as the U.S. began to shift its focus to the Middle East, millions of dollars would pour into the hands of countries willing to cooperate.

Yet despite the beginning of an offensive in the region, it was Secretary Dulles’ tour of the Middle East in 1953 that truly defined the course of American policy in the Middle East. While the United States had long recognized the British decline in power, it was not until Secretary Dulles spoke directly with the leaders of the Middle East that it was truly realized how deep the problems of Anglo relations in that region were. No longer would the U.S. allow the British to move but then take the blame. Washington would need to adopt a more independent policy in an effort to rid its ties to the U.K. in the Middle East. As Secretary Dulles argued, “To tie ourselves to the tail of the British kite in the Middle East…would be to abandon all hope for a peaceful alignment of that area with the West.”
In Search of Stability

The shift away from riding the coattails of the U.K. also pushed the U.S. away from Egypt as a possible anchor to its Middle Eastern defense concept. British policy in Egypt had so angered the new government, and perhaps most importantly the Egyptian people, that the cause seemed all but lost for the Americas (although this was not so for the British). During Secretary Dulles’ trip to the Middle East in 1953 he stopped in Cairo. His talks with Prime Minister Naguib and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fawzi seemed to reveal some common ground, no doubt. However, two constant problems were unshakeable: the British presence in Egypt, specifically at the Suez Canal, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The British were not willing to leave Suez and the problem of Israel was too fragile and complex to handle in a way that would appease Egypt, although America could have made more compromises in this area. The lack of diplomacy on this end would create problems just a few years down the road. Additionally, problems with internal politics and economics plagued the potential for Egypt as a leader of Middle Eastern defense: “Secretary Dulles…pointed out to the Council that even if the United States succeeded in selling this new formula to the British and Egyptians [a compromise on the Suez base], the larger problem of political and economic stability in Egypt would be with us for years to come.”

Stability here was the operative principle. Egypt had recently experienced a revolution, resulting in the radical change in domestic politics, and the instability worried Washington. There was no guarantee for the U.S. that this relationship would prove fruitful in even just a few years. Iraq, which had long been overlooked by the U.S., was beginning its slow creep into the sights of Washington because it did not suffer those same problems, at least on the surface. Dulles did not report at length on the potential of Iraq but his assessment
was far more generous than that of Egypt: “Secretary Dulles found Iraq to be the Arab State most plainly concerned with the Soviet threat, because it was closer to the USSR and because it bordered on Iran… Its government was forward-looking and was using the revenues from its oil resources for the development of the national economy.”

The search for stability speaks volumes about America’s interests in the region. By 1953, it was even more obvious the British were no longer able to orchestrate that. Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden even recognized this: “International law and the temper of international opinion is all set against the things which made us a great nation, i.e. our activities outside our own territory. Bit by bit we shall be driven back to our island where we shall starve.” Stability became the United States’ concern, fueled by the belief that instability meant vulnerability to nationalist movements and, in turn, communism. Communism would greatly diminish Western access to markets in the Middle East and therefore the project of rebuilding Western Europe.

Dulles and the U.S. government continued showing interest in Iraq, which increased considerably in the following months. The process had to be slow and methodical; it was a transition that would take diplomatic finesse in order to not publicly undermine Britain. The situation was further complicated as Iraq was shrewdly using the tension between the U.S. and Britain in order to procure as much aid from both sides as possible. On March 22nd, 1953, Foreign Minister al-Sawaidi met with U.S. Ambassador Berry and emphasized “the importance of Iraq to the West in terms of its oil reserves and strategic location.” He went on to assert that if Iraq shifted money from economic development to arms development, “communism would arise in Iraq.” American aid was necessary to thwart this, he argued. Certainly, American motivation for operating in the Middle East is best expressed through the
rhetoric and policy proposals of official USG documents; however, the strategy that Iraq took in order to obtain military aid is revealing, as well. In order to persuade the U.S. to arm Iraq, al-Sawaidi capitalized on American motivations: oil, for the rebuilding of Western Europe, and defeating communism.

Discussions of such oil production in the Middle East were simultaneously taking place in other agencies within the U.S. government; recommendations from these papers and studies undoubtedly guided the actions of the U.S. in Iraq and cannot be dismissed. For instance, the National Security Council—active in the push for military aid to Iraq—reiterated a long held belief on May 20th, 1953: “Retention of Middle East sources of supply will accordingly grow in importance, as will the need for developing and expanding all other possible sources... [T]he increasing importance of the Middle East as the greatest known source of petroleum must be recognized.” This, in conjunction with Iraqi officials’ reminders of the importance of their oil reserves, served as a catalyst in the United States’ shift toward providing aid to Iraq and developing a closer relationship with Baghdad.

Still, Iraq was pushing on both ends. Two days after declaring fear of Soviet aggression to the U.S.—something that Iraq had been relatively disinterested in only months before in late 1952—the Iraqi government threatened the British “with the possibility they would replace London with Washington as their chief Western ally.” This strategy seemed to be working in favor of the Iraqis. It caused Britain to refocus its strategy, especially in regard to the question of who would control the RAF bases still under British control in Iraq from the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. As the British worked tirelessly to persuade the U.S. that Iraq was still solidly in their corner, Minister of Defense Nuri “emphasized to [the America Counselor of the Embassy in Iraq and charge d’effaires, Phil Ireland,] his wish for [the] best
arms possible,” meaning that if “American tanks were better than British, he wanted them.”xlvii According to Ireland, Nuri asserted that the arms sent to the Middle East should be of the quality that would do the job of “stopping the Russians.”xlviii This rhetoric sought to exploit the American preoccupation with stopping the Soviets in the Middle East and push America toward granting Iraq weapons for free, which would then pressure Britain to do the same in order to maintain its special privilege there.

Yet it was still a fragile situation. On June 10th of 1953, Dulles responded to the request for military aid: “The United States Government regrets that it is not possible at this time to give a definite reply to the request of the Government of Iraq for arms and training assistance for the purpose of strengthening the Iraqi defense forces.”xlix This was due to a multitude of reasons. First, the Mutual Security funds for the fiscal year of 1953 were still being considered by Congress and were yet to be appropriated. Additionally, the President would have to sign off on this move in order for it to happen. Iraq had to meet the qualifications necessary to receive such aid. Second, despite the U.S. recognizing British problems in the region and with Iraq specifically, its official stance with the UK still acknowledged that they had been and should continue to be the “principal supplier of equipment for the Iraqi armed forces... These factors will be taken into account by the United States Government in the development of any program of United States military assistance to Iraq.”l

The pressure continued from Iraq, as did the cunning politicking. On August 20th, Dr. Jamali, serving at the time as the President of the Chamber of Deputies in Iraq, spoke with Ireland again and emphasized multiple points of concern in Iraq. While many of them were domestic—which should have served as a red-flag for the United States and its quest for
stability—Kamali also declared that Iraq “should abandon the profitless concept of Arab collective security and should come to working arrangements with Turkey and the West in common defense against Communism.” He was attempting to increase support among the Iraqi elite (and he already had Nuri as an ally) but in order to gain more support the U.S. had to show it was willing to send aid to Iraq. He asked bluntly, “What assistance could be expected from the United States in meeting them [the discussed reforms]?"

As the CIA successfully orchestrated a coup in Iran that placed the pro-Western Shah back in power, Ambassador Berry saw an opening. Iraq requested aid for a long time, officially since March 21st for a military grant, and the Berry saw the moment as “propitious for extension of military aid to Iraq in order to get maximum political return for the United States.” Notice, it was not in order to maximize the defense of Iraq; certainly, the USSR would have no troubles invading Iraq, with or without American military aid. The moment, rather, presented an opportunity for the U.S. to capitalize and maximize “political return.” Indeed, after plenty of time to contemplate, Berry believed the U.S. was “in a position to answer and the time was ripe locally to answer affirmatively.” In the Ambassador’s opinion, helping Iraq form a new mountain brigade would be the best option as it avoided intruding in Britain’s operations and would not threaten Israel.

This specific recommendation would not be executed. Still, though, there grew a discernible shift in the disposition of the internal discussions in Washington. While discussing military aid to Near Eastern countries, Colonel Sievers outlined the necessary steps in order for equipment to be sent to Iraq: none of those steps included discussion with Britain. Of course, others in the room took note of this. Barrow stated that, assuming the UK was still the principal supplier to Iraq, they would have to be consulted before a plan was put in place.
This reveals the gradual and cautious route the U.S. was taking toward arming Iraq. It was nevertheless an alarming shift as Britain’s considerations became less important as Iraq pushed harder for arms.

This movement by the U.S. brought Britain to the table. Fearful of being replaced in Iraq, London and Washington came together to formulate a plan that would appease both sides. Despite having common goals, the major barrier was still Britain’s historical role in the region; Britain’s prestige and empire hinged on American actions. After months of negotiating, an Anglo-American Memorandum of Understanding was signed on February 26th of 1954. As early as January, though, Iraq was informed they were receiving aid from the U.S. The details were nearly finalized in February. The U.S. had placated much of London’s concerns over American involvement in Iraq with this treaty. While the U.S. had succeeded in finding a way to supply arms to the Iraqis, the agreement included many limitations on American activity: the U.S. would make it known to Iraq that all training and arms dealing was complementary to those services supplied by the UK; the U.S. would confer with the UK on all deals with Iraq; the UK retained its position as director of the training and organization of the Iraqi forces, although the U.S. was allowed to accept Iraqi candidates for training in military schools. Finally, the United States’ Military Assistance Advisory Group would be allowed to operate in Iraq so long as it kept a close relationship with its British counterpart.

With this agreement, the U.S. guaranteed a role in structuring Iraqi security. However, the path to getting Iraq into an alliance with Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran was going to be just as difficult as it was to persuade the British to allow American operations in Baghdad. This regional defense alliance was based on America’s concept—really, Dulles’
initiative—of the “northern tier.” This was now the latest in many attempts at collective security in the region. The first, based on Egyptian cooperation, failed and only the UK was still holding out with real optimism on that end. A review of NSC 155/1 outlines this clearly: “The best prospect for creating an indigenous regional defense arrangement in the Near East lies in the concept of the ‘northern tier’, which would include Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq.” The U.S. was extremely concerned about the pact being perceived as indigenous; there could be no trace of the West in the creation of the alliance. In order to garner national support, it had to appear as if these countries were coming together on their own, without pressure or persuasion from America and the UK. The first step in this direction was orchestrating a Turko-Pakistani bilateral agreement; in January of 1954 the Eisenhower administration signed off on sending military aid to Pakistan, and by April of 1954 the bilateral alliance was successfully brought to fruition.

Getting Iraq to join was the most difficult piece. This created uncertainty in Washington as to whether granting aid to Iraq was the right move. In April of 1954 in an Arab League communiqué, after Nuri and Jamali had suggested Iraq would be willing to entertain the idea of joining the Turko-Pakistani pact, the Iraq representative denied any intention of joining a non-Arab collective security alliance. Specifically in front of its Arab peers, Iraq was unwilling to admit what it was pursuing privately: “As to the Turko-Pakistan alliance, the Iraqi representative affirmed in the name of his Government what the President of the Iraqi Council of Ministers had proclaimed, namely that Iraq had not been invited to join this alliance, that is has not considered joining and that everything which has been said concerning the connection of Iraq with this alliance is without foundation.” The U.S. viewed this with severe skepticism: “It seems to us that if the Iraqis are so unwilling to stand
up and be counted on the side of [the] free world...we should reflect very carefully before concluding agreement.” Indeed, Washington saw that pressure from the West might not work alone. Instead, Dulles believed that Iraq should meet with Turkey and Pakistan in order to “determine whether or not it wishes to associate itself with those and any other like-minded states in some form of mutually satisfactory cooperative agreement before we attempt to move further in military understanding with Iraq.”

But Iraq was vital to the Northern Tier. It gave it depth and strategic relevance as Iraq was competitive with Egypt in terms of economic development and oil production in the Arab world. “Our whole policy regarding military assistance to [the] Middle East is based on [the] concept of collective security,” Dulles reasserted firmly to Berry, implying the setback that would come with losing Iraq. At the same time—in fact, only one day after Dulles cabled the Embassy in Iraq of the importance of the Northern Tier—the State Department, DOD, and CIA were dealing with a civil antitrust suit involving Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc., Standard Oil Company of California, and The Texas Company. In assessing the suit and its consequences, the importance of oil to American interests was reviewed again; a cable sent from Under Secretary of State, Walter Smith, to the Attorney General, Herbert Brownell stated this with the utmost clarity: “The US national security interest in the Middle East in its basic aspect is concentrated upon keeping the area available to the West and denying it to the Soviet Bloc. Availability of the area is considered important because of the increasing role of the area’s petroleum resources in the supply of the West and because of the strategic position of the area as a whole. Under the assumption of continued cold war it has been considered essential that the oil resources of the Middle East be available to Western Europe so as to
avoid the depletion of Western hemisphere resources during the period of cold war.\textsuperscript{lxxv} The Northern Tier needed to take form, which meant the inclusion of Iraq.

Despite the consequences dependent upon Iraq’s cooperation, Ambassador Berry saw the U.S. skepticism as premature. He responded with great disappointment when Secretary Dulles recommended that Berry stall on negotiations and inform Iraq that aid may be pulled if Baghdad did not join the Turko-Pakistani alliance.\textsuperscript{lxxvi} “The Department’s decision, which at this time is tantamount to a withdrawal of the U.S. offer to military aid to Iraq, will be interpreted locally as giving the lie to the President’s side words on the strategic importance of the ME… In Iraq today we have a great opportunity. We are losing it, and may never again have a similar one.”\textsuperscript{lxxvii} Additionally, Dulles was given reassurance from Prime Minister Jamali who promised Berry and the American government that the announcement at the Arab League meeting had not been officially authorized.

It appears this bought more time for Iraq. It was not necessarily that Jamali and Nuri were disinterested in joining the Turko-Pakistani alliance, but doing so immediately after receiving aid from the U.S. would undermine the image of the pact being indigenous. This rational appealed to American interests, as they did not want to be viewed as the puppeteer in the arrangement. The U.S. responded to Berry and Iraq with a compromise to accommodate the Iraqi government. The new understanding between the U.S. and Iraq would not include language of a Tripartite Agreement, which Baghdad was pleased to be stricken, but instead the aid would be conditional on the “international situation at the time.”\textsuperscript{lxxviii} While vague on the surface, it was known privately what this meant: President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles “were in agreement that Iraq would need to join a Northern Tier alliance to receive the benefits of American largess.”\textsuperscript{lxxix} When Iraq agreed to the new language, and accepted the
aid from the U.S., their adherence to a larger alliance with Turkey and Pakistan was for the time being official. On April 25th, Baghdad publicized the military aid agreement. America had broken into Baghdad.

**The End Game: The Baghdad Pact**

Over the next many months numerous negotiations took place between the U.S., Iraq, and Britain, as well as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The dynamic was complex and ever changing. Britain was uncertain about the Baghdad Pact, especially when considering their Egyptian problems and the possibility of massive Arab blowback. Somehow, the UK still believed it could orchestrate an agreement with Egypt that would include them in the Middle Eastern defense alliance despite heavy anti-Westernism amongst Arabs. Additionally, America’s role in Iraq seemed to be expanding beyond the limits that were established in the 1954 Anglo-American Memorandum of Understanding. In March of 1955, Foreign Secretary Eden made clear Britain’s worries with the U.S. in Iraq: “We are already concerned at American attempts to supplant us in this field. In spite of our present understanding with the United States that the Iraqi forces should continue to look primarily to the United Kingdom for equipment and training, we must expect these attempts [by the U.S.] to continue.”

America’s main concern was the Northern Tier developments. Nuri and his pro-Western allies in Baghdad were extremely cautious when dealing with Turkey. While constant pressure was put on the Iraqi government from Egypt to not join in any collective security agreement with non-Arabs, the threat of the U.S. pulling aid from Baghdad made Nuri’s decisions very difficult. Constant reminders of the fragility of the Iraqi-American deal were present in discussions with Nuri. “[T]he U.S. was prepared to supply was dependent on
how quickly and extensively Iraq moved with her neighbors in the field of regional defense,” Ambassador Gallman told Nuri in early January. One month later the U.S. would get what it wanted from Iraq.

The complicated road to the eventual Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey, which was signed in the late-night hours of February 24th, 1955, has been thoroughly examined by numerous other scholars. Over the next months, Pakistan, Iran, and Great Britain would join Iraq and Turkey in what would eventually become the Baghdad Pact. The United States never officially joined, although played a role in the military planning committee. What is important here, in order to best examine America’s interests in Iraq, is not necessarily how Washington orchestrated this Pact but why. As I have shown thus far, America’s motive for gaining influence in Iraq via military aid was part of the overall goal of creating a Middle Eastern defense coalition. The Northern Tier concept was the end game; masked in hawkish rhetoric of defense, the Baghdad Pact was never truly about the defense of the region in a military sense. The U.S. made this quite clear in internal assessments from the very beginning of the long road to Baghdad. In 1952, when the State Department was still focusing on fostering a relationship with Egypt but began mulling the possibility of Iraq, Ambassador Crocker cabled Washington: “[I]n order [to] retain bargaining power on MEC [Middle Eastern Command], Emb[assy] [would] recommend that we not at this time provide arms on a scale permitting Iraqis [to] expand [their] mil[itary] forces.” If the U.S. was truly serious about the defense of Iraq, this would not have been their disposition. In 1954, the same sentiment remained. The USG knew that the Baghdad Pact meant relatively little militarily, despite the rhetoric justifying the need for the alliance: The collective security arrangement was primarily “political and psychological rather than military” oriented.
Ensuring Middle Eastern alliance with the West—and blocking Soviet influence—was the primary goal, which was sought through this alliance. If the Soviets were to gain influence in Iraq, for instance, there would be the very high possibility of a decrease in oil exports to Western Europe. It is no secret that the USSR disagreed with the West on the question of Germany and the rest of Western Europe. Issues of concessions, de-industrialization, de-Nazification, and the rationing of food were all points of contention between the U.S. and USSR. By 1955, the debate was over because Germany had been divided into East and West and the U.S. began rebuilding not only Western Germany but all of Western Europe, as well. The Soviets felt insulted by many of the steps the U.S. had taken in this regard as they had suffered immeasurably during the war. Because the USSR has contributed to the successful campaign against the Nazis, it was insulting that they seemed to take a back seat to the concerns of the West.

Losing the Middle East would have been unquestionably destructive to the United States’ objectives in Western Europe. There was a considerable amount of emphasis on this point throughout 1953-55. This comes as no surprise as the Middle East had become the biggest supplier of oil to Western Europe by 1955: “[I]n 1938, only 19 per cent of Western Europe’s oil had come from the Persian Gulf area, [but] by 1955 British Government figures showed that 90 per cent of supplies came from this source.” If the U.S. could create allies in the region then it would be better postured to react as it would have close diplomatic relations with nations there. In 1956, this proved to be important. As the Suez Crisis unfolded, the United States government ensured that antitrust cases against American oil companies operating in the Middle East were either suspended or killed (by way of immunity) in order to “meet Europe’s oil needs” despite the effect it would have on local
populations.\textsuperscript{lxxviii} This reaction was rooted in America’s fear of nationalism, which is intimately tied to its fear of communism, as well. As Toby Jones, professor of history at Rutgers University, writes of the intersection of nationalism, oil, and foreign policy, “During the 1950s and 1960s U.S. government officials and oil-company executives feared the potential power of Arab nationalists and the possibility that they might nationalize Arab oil and refuse to supplicate to American and Western interests.”\textsuperscript{lxxix} If Egypt was successful in nationalizing the Suez, would Arabs push for further nationalization?

The U.S. believed that the Northern Tier strategy and the Baghdad Pact was their answer to ensuring this did not occur in Iraq. Pan-Arabism was certainly apparent among the people, but where it policy was influenced (government) Baghdad was in the West’s corner as of 1955. The U.S. and Britain had members on the Iraq Development Board, which oversaw the programs funded by oil revenues.\textsuperscript{lxxx} With the leverage of military aid the U.S. could protect its oil interests in the country.

In response to the United States’ move in the Middle East, the Soviets began to pursue a more aggressive stance, aimed primarily at Egypt and Syria,\textsuperscript{lxiii} in order to thwart the potential of Iraq rising as the leader in the Arab world. This was concerning to the U.S. and UK: Certain “Middle Eastern governments had shown a willingness and capability to deny western access to oil reserves…and to disrupt Middle East oil transport facilities.”\textsuperscript{lxiii} This was a direct reference to both Egypt and Syria. It would prove to be a nightmare for the U.S. if this trend continued: “A supply of oil from the Middle East in a steadily increasing volume is essential to the economic progress and the strategic strength of the NATO countries,” read a paper summarizing UK-U.S. understanding of the situation in the Middle East. However, this was exactly why the U.S. was so interested in a “defense” coalition in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{lxxiii}
Indeed, Washington recognized the importance of the newly constructed pact: The U.S. was “assisted substantially by elements of strength resulting from the Baghdad Pact,” which meant the nations of the Pact were not at risk of falling to Soviet influence. The paper concluded with multiple recommendations on what policies to continue. On top the list was giving “full support to the Baghdad Pact.”

**Conclusion: The Baghdad Pact without Baghdad**

The U.S. never became an official signatory of the Baghdad Pact. Washington ignored its own advice and allowed its desire for the Pact to be viewed as indigenously constructed to guide the decision of not becoming a member. There were numerous variables at play—in addition to the failure of the U.S. to fully commit—that caused the Baghdad Pact to fail: popular anti-Westernism in Arab nations, a lack of progression on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and successful campaigns conducted by the USSR to undermine American efforts in the region. Most damning was the 1958 overthrow of the pro-Western Iraqi government, which eventually resulted in Baghdad pulling out of the Pact. Washington, being so preoccupied with preventing the Soviets from developing positive relations in the region, blatantly ignored the very real problems that needed attention.

First, the assumption that Iraq would spark an Arab switch to the side of the West was extremely misguided. Although the U.S. understood Egypt to be firmly neutralist, officials in Washington still believed in the possibility of other countries—such as Jordan and Syria—jumping into America’s camp. This reveals a gross oversimplification of Middle Eastern politics, Arab nationalism, and Islamic culture. The region is certainly not a homogeneous one; Aga-Oglu, one of the greatest students of Islamic art in the mid-20th century, draws the
parallel of Islamic art and culture: “Islamic art…is a composite art. It is a manifestation of a civilization and not of a culture. Although bound by a single faith, the countries and the peoples of Islam do not constitute a single culture.” Of course, the State Department was not likely to analyze Middle Eastern art in order to guide its policy; however, Aga-Oglu’s point is one of great relevance: The complexity of the region has been present for centuries and, if not understood, leads to a massive disconnect between those within it and those viewing it from outside.

Second, the U.S. ignored the very real resentment most Iraqis held for the West. It was not as if the U.S. didn’t recognize the problems; in December of 1956, the CIA expressed concerns over antigovernment demonstrations in Baghdad that were expressly “pro-Nasr.” Later, in July, the CIA estimated that while Iraq was the most stable Arab state, and was hopeful about future U.S.-Iraqi relations, there were ominous indicators that in just two years would prove fateful. Immediately after predicting that any change in regime would result in the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, the National Intelligence Estimate asserted, “the chances of Iraq pursuing such a course would be substantially lessened if another Arab state joined the Pact.” Here lies the dangerous of oversimplifying the Middle East and Arab nationalism.

This blindness was exemplified in the cultural campaign the U.S. undertook in Iraq, as well. In 1954, President Eisenhower authorized the State Department to begin a cultural outreach program that utilized American jazz artists. Just a few weeks prior to the 1958 Iraqi Revolution, William Smith—the Acting Country Public Officer in Baghdad—wrote that the performances were “not only highly welcomed by the Iraqis but also go a long way in helping countries of widely differing cultures to understanding one another a little better.” That
America put so much effort into this superficial cultural outreach and ignored very real issues exemplifies its naiveté in the region. It also resulted in the dissolution of the Baghdad Pact, which allowed the USSR to gain more influence in the region than it ever had before.

This failure had numerous consequences for the U.S. Its reach into Iraqi affairs was cut off and its credibility took a blow in the region. However, its reliance on oil seemed to be untouched. The response to the failure of the Baghdad Pact simply reiterated the true reason for America’s involvement in Iraq. Despite some reservations due to nationalist developments, the U.S. believed that “the odds [were] against developments in regard to Middle East oil that would be critically detrimental to U.S. national interests.” Indeed, the companies that had made their headway into the region were already in place. The fear that oil would be completely cut off, which drove America’s Middle Eastern strategy, was not realized.

Due to private American oil companies remaining in the region, the continued development of Western Europe was still executed. The battle with the Soviet Union would continue for decades, filled with plenty more cold war showdowns much like the one that played out in Iraq in the 1950s. Of course, the USSR never conducted a military strike against the U.S. and, by-and-large, confined its actions to cold war politics. The bombastic language from Washington never ceased, however. Herein, I have not made the argument that the U.S. was wrong to look at the Middle East in terms of an exploitable opportunity; rather, I have simply shown through the development of American involvement in Iraq and the subsequent construction of the Baghdad Pact that the primary objective was access to oil markets. Whether one agrees that economic incentives are appropriate factors in national
security decisions is debatable. The fact that oil markets drove the U.S. to the Middle East in the beginning of the Cold War is not.

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1 Memorandum from Hoskins to Byroade, 7 April 1952. *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Near and Middle East, 1952-1954* (Washington, GPO, 1986) IX, Pt. II. By this year, the U.S. had already recognized the dwindling prestige of Britain and France in the Middle East.


ix Ibid


xiii Interview with General Clay by Richard D. McKinzie, 16 July, 1974. Clay describes how as early as 1946, only one year after the war had ended, it was already obvious that the U.S. needed to rebuild Western Europe with Germany included.
xiv Memorandum by Assistant Secretary Thorp to the Secretary of State, “NSC 97—A National Petroleum Program,” 3 January 1951, FRUS, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, 1951, I.

xv Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (University of California Press, 1984), 216. See also: Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 by Carolynn Eisenberg and The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From ‘Empire’ by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift by Geir Lundestad.

xvi National Security Council, "NSC-68 United States Objectives and Programs for National Security."

xvii David S. Painter, “International Oil and National Security,” 120, no. 4 (1991), 185


xxii For a thorough examination on the origin of the Cold War see Eisenberg’s Drawing the Line


xxviii Memorandum from Hoskins to Byroade, 7 April 1952, FRUS, The Near and Middle East, 1952-1954, IX, Pt. II.

xxix Ibid

xxx Ibid


xxxvii Ibid


xxxix Ibid


xlii Ibid


xlv Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in Iraq (Barrow), [Undated]. *FRUS, The Near and Middle East, 1952-1954*, IX, Pt. II.

xlvi Ibid

xlvii The Charge in Iraq (Ireland) to the Department of State, 28 March 1953. *FRUS, The Near and Middle East, 1952-1954*, IX, Pt. II.

xlviii Ibid

xlix The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq, 10 June 1953, *FRUS, The Near and Middle East, 1952-1954*, IX, Pt. II.
The Department of State to the British Embassy, 1 July 1953, *FRUS, The Near and Middle East, 1952-1954*, IX, Pt. II.

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lxviii The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq, 19 April 1954, *FRUS, The Near and Middle East, 1952-1954*, IX, Pt. II.


lxxiii Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, 5 January 1955, *FRUS, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, 1955-1957*, XII.

lxxiv See: Sanjin, “The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact”

lxxv The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Department of State, 21 April 1952, *FRUS, The Near and Middle East, 1952-1954*, IX, Pt. II.

lxxvi Memorandum for the National Security Council, United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, 6 July 1954.


lxsti Ibid

lxstii Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State, 14 May 1957, *FRUS, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, 1955-1957*, X.

lxstiv Ibid

lxstv Ibid


The Outlook for Iraq’s Stability and Foreign Policies, 17 July 1956, *FRUS, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, 1955-1957*, XII.


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